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Over the past decade, UN blue helmets have been dispatched to ever more challenging environments from
the Congo to Timor to perform an expanding set of tasks. But all too often, the UN have been “flying blind” in
their efforts to stabilize countries ravaged by war. The UN realized the need to put knowledge, guidance, and
reflection on failures and successes at the centre of the institution. Building on an innovative multi-disciplinary
framework, this study provides a first comprehensive account of learning in peacekeeping. Catherine Baker
finds that this book is a useful snapshot of the policy-making process in the largest and most complex of
international organisations.
The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build
Peace? Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp
Rotmann. Oxford University Press. June 2011.
 
Is the United Nations capable of  learning f rom its peacekeeping
experiences in the f ield? The recent history of  peacekeeping identif ies
the f ailures in Rwanda and Srebrenica as turning points that f orced the
UN to reshape its approach. The narrative of  a later phase that Thorsten
Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp Rotmann present in their study
of  attempts to transf orm the UN into a ‘learning organisation’ (p. 4) is f ar
less dramatic, but valuable f or understanding the nature and the
problems of  peace operations today.
This study by three researchers f rom the Global Public Policy Institute in
Berlin is a bureaucratic history of  how the growing complexity and scale
of  peace operations f orced the UN to improve its procedures. Its f ocus
is on a generation of  ref ormers in peace operations management who challenged the improvisation- led
culture of  the UN Department of  Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and tried to establish procedures f or
organisational learning.
These f igures are f ar lower in prof ile than Kof i Annan or Lakhdar Brahimi, the coordinator of  the Report of
the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping in 2000, yet they also played signif icant roles in the institutional
history of  the UN. Among them were Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, David Harland and Salman Ahmed,
UN polit ical of f icers with experience in f ormer Yugoslavia who draf ted what became the UN Secretary-
General’s Report into the Srebrenica massacre; Mark Kroeker, an incoming Police Adviser who was able to
strengthen the UN’s policy on when and how to deploy police; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the head of  the
DPKO who promoted ref orms to the wider UN bureaucracy; and Sérgio Vieira de Mello, an experienced
transit ional administrator whose commitment to institutional learning f rom previous missions was cut short
by his death in the Baghdad Canal Hotel bombing in 2003.
Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann show that the DPKO Guéhenno inherited in 2000 was characterised by
an ‘entrenched organisational core’ (p. 27) that valued quick improvisation and limited resources but
resisted crit ical ref lection on its working practices. This dated back to an ‘ad hoc culture’ (p. 28) of  UN
peacekeeping that had been f ormed in the scramble to respond to the Suez crisis and that was ‘easily
absorbed and reproduced’ (p. 30) by the new managers who joined DPKO as peacekeepers af ter the Cold
War. This resonates with the experiences of  UN bureaucracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina expressed by f ormer
peacekeepers and civilian staf f .
For the UN to learn f rom f ield experience at an organisational level it must have procedures f or gathering,
preserving and ref lecting on knowledge – in short, an institutional memory. The structure of  UN missions
and careers impedes this severely.  The authors are right to note the ‘extreme turnover ’ of  staf f  on
missions: on average less than 4 years f or civilian staf f , and only 6 to 12 months f or most military and
police personnel, who are seconded f rom their own countries and careers (p. 35). Well-organised
handover/takeover periods are necessary f or knowledge to even be preserved within one mission. In 2004,
a team led by David Harland f ound that 46 per cent of  the f ield staf f  they surveyed ‘had received no
guidance materials or orderly handover ’ when taking up their post and 50 per cent f elt they had had ‘to
reinvent the wheel “very of ten” or “all the time”’ (p. 44).
Many organisational obstacles thus stand in the way of  f eeding knowledge to the top of  the bureaucracy
and, just as importantly, distributing it back out so that it will benef it other missions. The ref orms of  the
Brahimi and Guéhenno generation aimed to overcome these but, the authors f ound, were hindered by
structural f actors beyond their control. An ef f ective, learning bureaucracy, they argue, requires ‘staf f
members [who] identif y with the organization, get rewarded and see a medium-term f uture’ in order f or them
to be able and willing to contribute to the organisation’s shared knowledge base (p. 221). It seems that UN
human resources practices and the short- term contracts of f ered to f ield staf f  did not and still do not
incentivise this kind of  contribution.
The authors’ study is deliberately limited to DPKO, not to any other branch of  the UN that participates in
multi-dimensional missions. Their work nonetheless of f ers both a f ramework and an agenda f or extending
this type of  research, with clear criteria f or assessing success in implementing ref orms. The research
design is issue- led rather than mission-driven, enabling them to f ollow the trajectories of  people and
practices on a larger scale.
Four issues – police assistance, judicial ref orm, reintegration of  f ormer combatants, and mission
integration – are selected as examples of  the scope of  contemporary peace operations, and developed
through three case studies. In the chapter on police,  these are the development of  basic standards f or so-
called Formed Police Units (gendarmeries, conf usingly called ‘constabulary police’ in UN jargon); the
creation of  a Standing Police Capacity as recommended by Brahimi; and the attempt to create a conceptual
shif t in DPKO regarding police institution-building and accountability. Quick and ef f ective deployment of
police assistance is vital in the early stages of  an operation: where this is slow, as in the Kosovo
deployment, crime and post-conf lict persecution may have worsened, and local civilian conf idence in the UN
may never be repaired (p. 84).
In 2005, DPKO still had no doctrine of  its own on joint police operations with military peacekeepers, use of
f orce by police, or methods of  crowd control; the diversity of  states that contributed FPUs meant that the
organisation had no automatic common ref erence point. A f irst-generation doctrine was produced, largely
replicating concept-of -operations documents that had been written by the police missions in Liberia and
Haiti yet not circulated throughout the organisation. Missions’ police commissioners and the member states
contributing police were, however, not accountable to DPKO’s Police Division, making it dif f icult to exercise
quality control. An incident in Kosovo in 2007 where UN police killed two protestors af ter f iring rubber
bullets led to another round of  doctrine-writ ing on f ormed police which, at the authors’ t ime of  writ ing, was
not yet complete.
This outcome appears typical of  many ef f orts to improve organisational learning in the UN. Of  the 12
processes studied in this book, more than half  ended up incomplete, including 4 that ‘f izzled out’ during
advocacy and 3 that were adopted but not implemented (p. 211). The authors thus warn of  ‘serious
persisting weaknesses in the learning capacity’ (p. 211), and conf irm their hypothesis that polit ical f actors
rather than the condition of  the learning inf rastructure are dominant in determining whether ref orms will
take place. Prof essional training, accountability mechanisms and evaluation procedures, they recommend,
must all be overhauled if  this endemic problem is ever to improve.
This book is a usef ul snapshot of  the policy-making process in the largest and most complex of
international organisations. It gives context to the growing number of  bottom-up studies of  the everyday
cultural and spatial practices of  peace operations, though it does not substitute f or them. The incomplete
outcomes of  many of  its case studies are the responsibility of  those people and institutions who slowed
them down, not of  the authors. It will be the task of  f uture researchers with a longer view to assess
whether or not the hopes placed in the UN by the authors, by UN staf f  and by at least some of  the
population in post-conf lict societies were able to be f ulf illed.
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